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Constitutional Discourse and
the Rhetoric of Treason
by J. RICHARD BROUGHTON*

I. Introduction
“There’s a Smell of Treason in the Air.”1
So read the title of commentary in The New York Times on March 23,
2017 (quoting presidential historian Douglas Brinkley).2 Three days earlier,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) had confirmed in a
congressional hearing that Donald Trump’s presidential campaign was under
federal investigation for possible complicity with Russian active measures
in American elections.3 Times columnist Nicholas Kristof then penned this
piece focused not primarily upon the Russia investigation, but upon the
actions of Richard Nixon as he campaigned for the presidency in 1968.
Nixon, Kristof explains, was engaged in a deliberate strategy to
sabotage President Lyndon B. Johnson’s effort to bring the war in Vietnam
to a peaceful resolution.4 Nixon, the story goes, was frustrated by President
Johnson’s effort to work with the South Vietnamese to end the war, and
thereby improve the election prospects for Vice President Hubert Humphrey,
Nixon’s opponent.5 Nixon therefore created a backchannel to Saigon with
the aim of staving off peace until after his election.6 His personal envoy was
a Republican fundraiser, with whom Nixon met the ambassador from South
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy
School of Law. I am grateful to Erin Rodenhouse for her outstanding research assistance, and to
Kyle Langvardt for his helpful comments.
1. Nicholas Kristof, There’s A Smell of Treason in the Air, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/opinion/theres-a-smell-of-treason-in-the-air.html.
2. Id.
3. See Russell Berman, It’s Official: The FBI Is Investigating Trump’s Links to Russia, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/its-official-thefbi-is-investigating-trumps-links-to-russia/520134/.
4. Kristof, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
[303]
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Vietnam.
An angry President Johnson reportedly described Nixon’s
machinations as “treason.”8
Although this story was only conjecture for nearly fifty years, in
January 2017, the Times published a piece that revealed the personal notes
of Harry Robbins Haldeman, who would go on to infamously serve as
Nixon’s White House Chief of Staff, which arguably confirmed Nixon’s role
in the peace talks sabotage.9
Kristof calls this the “greatest political scandal in American history,” and
concludes, “it’s hard to see [Nixon’s] behavior as anything but treason.”10
He then turns his attention to the Trump-Russia investigation. He notes
the Russians’ potential influence on Trump in light of Trump’s work in
private business, and states that Trump was “by nature inclined to admire
[Russian President] Vladimir Putin as a strongman ruler.”11 He also
highlighted Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort’s ties to Russia.
Kristof’s ultimate question—which he left open in light of the need for more
evidence—was a weighty one: “was there treason?”12
This occurred only two months into the Trump presidency. After
Kristof’s article, public reporting revealed that multiple members of the
Trump campaign had direct contact with representatives of the Russian
government.13 After the recusal of United States Attorney General Jeff
Sessions (among those who, it turned out, had contact with Russians), and
appointment of Special Counsel Robert Mueller, Special Counsel secured
multiple high-profile indictments against, or guilty pleas from, Trump
campaign officials.14 Special Counsel also secured indictments against
thirteen Russian individuals and the Internet Research Agency, which the
indictment describes as a “Russian organization engaged in operations to
interfere with elections and political processes.”15
Then came the President’s meeting with President Putin in Helsinki,
Finland in July 2018.
7. Kristof, supra note 1..
8. Id.
9. Peter Baker, Nixon Tried to Spoil Johnson’s Peace Talks in ‘68, Notes Show, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/02/us/politics/nixon-tried-to-spoil-johnsons-viet
nam-peace-talks-in-68-notes-show.html.
10. Kristof, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Meg Kelly, All the Known Times the Trump Campaign Met with Russians, WASH. POST
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/11/13/all-of-theknown-times-the-trump-campaign-met-with-russians/.
14. Indictment, U.S. v. Manafort & Gates, No. 1:17-cr-00201 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2017); see also
Statement of the Offense, U.S. v. Papadopolous, No. 1:17-cr-00182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017)
(providing factual basis for guilty plea of former Trump campaign foreign policy advisor for
making false statements to federal investigators during Russian active measures investigation).
15. Indictment, U.S. v. Internet Research Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018).
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On the Friday preceding the Helsinki meeting, the United States Justice
Department announced that it had obtained indictments against twelve
members of the Russian military intelligence services—the Main
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (“GRU”). It alleged that these
defendants “engaged in cyber operations that involved the staged releases of
documents stolen through computer intrusions.16 These units conducted
large-scale cyber operations to interfere with the 2016 United States
presidential election.”17 President Putin has consistently denied that his
government engaged in, directed, or supported the alleged attacks on
American elections, and repeated these denials in Helsinki.18 He did
acknowledge, however, that he wished to see Trump elected as President of
the United States.19
In Helsinki, President Trump failed to publicly condemn the Russian
government, the named defendants in the indictments, and others connected
to Russia who may have been involved in the alleged operations.20 During
a press conference there, he appeared to accept Putin’s denials, and although
he said that both countries were blameworthy, he was unspecific about
Russia’s culpability, and did not confront Putin about the concerns that the
American intelligence community had first raised in 2016.21
President Trump’s performance in Helsinki was condemned across the
American political spectrum.22 At one extreme were those who said that his
actions were “treasonous.”23
In the spring of 2019, the Special Counsel’s investigation ultimately
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the Trump
campaign had engaged in a criminal conspiracy or had in any way

16. Indictment, U.S. v. Netyksho,, No. 1:18-cr-00215, at 1 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018).
17. Id.
18. John T. Bennett, Trump, Putin Address Election Meddling Charges in Helsinki, ROLL
CALL (July 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trump-putin-summit.
19. Stephanie Murray, Putin: I Wanted Trump to Win the Election, POLITICO (July 16, 2018,
12:07 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/16/putin-trump-win-election-2016-722486.
20. Jordyn Phelps & Meridith McGraw, Trump Casts Doubt on US Intelligence, Calls Putin’s
Meddling Denial ‘Strong and Powerful,’ ABC NEWS (July 16, 2018, 5:16 PM), https://abcnews.go.
com/Politics/stakes-high-expectations-low-trump-putin-meet-helsinki/story?id=56603366.
21. Id.
22. U.S. Lawmakers Condemn Trump Over Helsinki Summit with Putin, REUTERS (July 16,
2018, 1:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-summit-lawmakers-highlight/uslawmakers-condemn-trump-over-helsinki-summit-with-putin-idUSKBN1K62P2.
23. Christina Zhao, President Donald Trump ‘Treasonous’ in Helsinki, Says Half of America
in New Poll, NEWSWEEK (July 20, 2018, 7:23 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/president-donaldtrump-acted-treasonous-helsinki-says-half-america-new-poll-1034104; Mike Lillis, Hoyer: Trump
Committed ‘Treason’ in Helsinki, THE HILL (July 17, 2018, 1:52 PM), https://thehill.com/home
news/house/397456-hoyer-trump-committed-treason-in-helsinki.
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coordinated with the Russians that would violate federal campaign law.24
Still, though, the findings, or “Mueller Report,” also produced extensive
evidence of contact between the two entities.25 The Report was equivocal
on whether the President had engaged in criminal obstruction of justice with
respect to the Special Counsel’s investigation, declining to bring an
indictment (long-standing United States Justice Department policy would
forbid such an indictment), but refusing to rule out criminality on the part of
the President.26 So although the Mueller Report found insufficient evidence
for a criminal prosecution regarding the connection between the Trump
campaign and the Russian government, it did little to dispel the suspicions
of those who believe the Trump campaign endeavored to obtain Russian
assistance (even if doing so did not violate a criminal statute), and likely
benefitted, at least indirectly, from the Russian efforts.27
Still, despite the possibility that the Mueller Report could have helped
to at least mitigate some of the treason rhetoric that exploded in recent years,
President Trump has constantly added fuel to the treason talk fire.
On May 23, 2019, the President—after being reminded by a reporter
that treason is a capital offense—lobbed the treason accusation against
several specific individuals from the federal law enforcement community,
who played roles in the Russian active measures investigation.28 In
particular, he attacked the opposition to his presidential candidacy by FBI
lawyer Lisa Page and Special Agent Peter Strzok, and accused them of
wanting the Russia investigation as an “insurance policy” if Trump won the
presidential election, concluding “that’s treason. That’s treason.”29
A few days earlier, on May 17, 2019, the President appeared to accuse
federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies generally of treason,

24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019) at 9-10 (hereinafter
MUELLER REPORT, VOL. I).
25. Id. at 5-8.
26.U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019) at 2 (hereinafter
MUELLER REPORT, VOL. II) (“[W]hile this report does not conclude that the President committed
a crime, it also does not exonerate him.”).
27. Morgan Chalfant, Jimmy Carter: Trump Only Won in 2016 Because of Russian Meddling,
THE HILL (June 28, 2019, 11:36 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/450877-jimmycarter-trump-only-won-in-2016-because-of-russian-meddling; see also MUELLER REPORT, VOL. I.,
at 5 (stating that the Trump campaign “expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen
and released through Russian efforts”).
28. President Donald J. Trump, Remarks on Supporting America’s Farmers and Ranchers,
THE WHITE HOUSE (May 23, 2019, 4:28 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements
/remarks-president-trump-supporting-americas-farmers-ranchers/ (Trump named former FBI
Director James Comey, former FBI Deputy Director and Acting Director Andrew McCabe, former
Special Agent Peter Strzok, and former FBI lawyer Lisa Page).
29. Trump, supra note 28.
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tweeting that his campaign was “conclusively spied on . . . . this was
TREASON!”30 In April of 2019, he posted a Tweet in which he said that
Democrats were “treasonous” in opposing the President’s policies at the
United States southern border.31 In May of 2018, the President posted a
Tweet that denounced White House leakers as “traitors.”32 Shortly after
taking office, he used the same label for former United States Army soldier
Chelsea Manning, after she had been released from incarceration for
providing military information to WikiLeaks.33 He also referred to treason
in rebuking the anonymous author of a New York Times op-ed piece that
criticized him.34 He even alluded to treason—in response to the claim from
an audience member at a rally—in describing the refusal of congressional
Democrats to stand and applaud during his 2018 State of the Union Address;
the White House now claims this was just a joke.35
Missing from this rhetoric is appreciation for the legal problems, some
of them quite complicated, that would be key to determining if anyone
committed treason.
The Treason Clause of Article III, Section 3 of the United States
Constitution provides the relevant legal text. Narrowing American treason
from the far broader English statute on which it was based,36 American
treason consists “only” of “levying war” against the United States or
“adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.”37 To be found
guilty of American treason, one must owe allegiance to the United States.38

30. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 17, 2019, 4:11 AM), https://twit
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1129343742748569601.
31. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 10, 2019, 7:33 PM), https://twit
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1116167275948597249 (writing “I think what Democrats are
doing with the open border is TREASONOUS.”).
32. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 14, 2018, 1:46 PM), https://twit
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/996129630913482755 (stating “leakers are traitors and cowards”).
33. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 26, 2017, 3:04 AM), https://twit
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/824573698774601729 (stating that “[u]ngrateful TRAITOR
Chelsea Manning, who should never have been released from prison, is now calling President
Obama a weak leader. Terrible!”).
34. Allie Malloy, Trump on New York Times Op-ed: ‘You Could Call It Treason’, CNN (Sept.
6, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/06/politics/trump-new-york-times-op-ed/index
.html.
35. President Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump on Tax Reform, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Feb. 5, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presi
dent-trump-tax-reform-3/. See also Dan Merica & Jim Acosta, Trump was ‘joking’ when he
accused Democrats of treason, White House says, CNN (Feb. 6, 2018, 12:49 PM), https://www.
cnn.com/2018/02/06/politics/treason-donald-trump-joking/index.html (quoting White House press
secretary saying the President was “clearly joking.”).
36. Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. III, ch. 2 (1351).
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2381.
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Therefore, treason law does not require affirmative proof of an enemy
for all treasons. Proof of an enemy is not mandated for Levying War
Treason. That is, one may “levy war” against the United States, and thereby
commit treason, without the Government showing beyond a reasonable
doubt that he or she waged war on behalf of an enemy. By waging war, the
perpetrator does not become an enemy; he is, rather, a traitor because he
owes allegiance.39 Adherence Treason, however, requires proof that the
alleged traitor intended to betray the United States by giving aid and comfort
to an enemy of the nation.40 One is therefore either an enemy or a traitor, but
not both.
The constitutional definition of treason is codified in Section 2381 of
Title 18 of the United States Code.41 The statutory definition does not—
indeed, cannot—deviate from the constitutional one because the elements of
treason are fixed by the Constitution.
None of the recent treason talk appears to consider these constitutional
elements: Is Russia an enemy of the United States? Who, in fact, are United
States enemies, as that term is used and understood in American treason law,
and how do we determine this designation? Did any of these accused traitors
actually intend to betray the country? Did any party actually levy war against
the United States?
Naturally, the kind of treason talk we have witnessed during recent
years, but particularly during the current presidency, can be easily dismissed
as bluster. Treason has long-served as a political epithet,42 but typically the
rhetorical force of a treason accusation tends to far outweigh its legal force.
Simply contrast the sheer number of popular treason accusations over the
past few decades to the sheer number of actual treason prosecutions (none).
The treason accusation may also tend to serve as a kind of energetic
euphemism for national disloyalty. One, however, may be disloyal to the
country without committing treason. In most instances, then, the accusations
of treason we have had to recently endure simply cannot be taken seriously.
Nevertheless, there are lessons to be drawn from the current environment of
promiscuous treason rhetoric.
39. Edward Coke, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 4-5
(1671) (distinguishing between traitor and enemy); accord 1 Matthew Hale, HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 59 (1736); see also Carlton F. W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law
of Treason, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 874-900 (2006) (analyzing English and American authorities
on allegiance, and discussing problem of whether non-citizen terrorists are subject to the Treason
Clause).
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (emphasis added).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2381.
42. J. Richard Broughton, The Snowden Affair and the Limits of American Treason, 3
LINCOLN MEM’L. U. L. REV. 5, 7 (2015); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism:
An Explanation and Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1443, 1444 (2009).
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This Article asserts that treason talk is a form of constitutional
discourse. Further, the Article explains that although treason remains a
crime worth taking seriously in American criminal and constitutional law,
colloquial invocations of treason have the potential to undermine treason’s
seriousness and erode its constitutional and historical foundations, as well as
diminish an appreciation of its limits. That is particularly true when treason
is invoked by a sitting president, whose unique role in constitutional
government—and potential to influence criminal prosecutions—requires
special caution with respect to public rhetoric about treason. This Article
then cites two specific and complicated areas of treason law that are often
overlooked in today’s public commentary on treason: (1) whether a person
owing allegiance to America has aided an “enemy” of the United States, such
that giving aid and comfort to them would be treasonous; and (2) whether a
person owing allegiance acted with an intent to betray the United States. The
complicated nature of these two issues reinforces the need for meaningful,
but more prudent and constitutionally focused, public conversations about
treason. Ultimately, this Article contends that a more responsible public
discourse about treason may be helpful in framing and resolving important
questions of constitutional meaning, to appreciate the limits of American
treason, and to reflect on whether and how we should revive punishment of
national disloyalty.

II. The (Mostly) Vices of Today’s Treason Talk, and the Virtues
of Constitutional Discourse on Treason
In informal conversation, it is not unusual to conflate two distinct
crimes that seem similar, or to use the language of the criminal law to
describe something that is not actually a prosecutable crime. Think, for
example, about the person whose home is invaded while she is away on
vacation, only to return and find many valuables missing from the home. “I
was robbed!” she might exclaim, though the offense against her property was
most likely burglary, and not robbery.43 Or think about the person who
describes the victim of a homicide as one who was “murdered,” even though
the victim may have been killed, for example, in self-defense or through the
justifiable use of police force.44 Even those who are law-trained will tend to
forgive these kinds of colloquial uses of criminal law terminology, and,
though inaccurate, accept them as a part of how we communicate with one
another without pointing out the need to consult statute books and case law.

43. MODEL PEN. CODE, § 222.1(1) (robbery typically requires that property be taken from the
person by force or threat of force).
44. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 581 (2d ed. 2010) (murder requires
that the killing of another be unlawful, without justification or excuse).
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People do not always wish to be lawyered, and we typically do not demand
legal precision from nonlawyers in casual conversation.
With contemporary treason talk, though, the problem goes beyond the
unremarkable assertion that nonlawyers do not always speak with legal
precision. Consequently, we should be prepared to more readily condemn—
or at least correct—colloquial uses of treason, particularly where treason is
invoked as part of a public narrative. After all, notwithstanding the examples
above, we would not lightly accept a public accusation that X is a “murderer”
if X did not actually commit the crime of murder, nor would we tolerate
publicly accusing X of being a “rapist” if X did not commit the crime of rape.
These are serious offenses, the accusation of which brings immediate stigma
and other social consequences. This is also true for treason. By
understanding treason talk as a form of constitutional discourse, there are
then compelling reasons to urge greater care when engaging in treason talk,
eschewing the colloquial use of the term as a political tool and hewing as
closely as possible to the fundamentals of treason as criminal and
constitutional law. Divorcing treason rhetoric from the constitutional text
and its underlying concerns thus works its own form of infidelity—that is,
infidelity to the Constitution itself.
A. Taking a Serious Law, and Its Underlying Values, Seriously

First, treason is a crime of national disloyalty that has long been
regarded with a special degree of seriousness. If it is desirable to continue
enforcing treason law because betrayal to the country is potentially harmful
to American institutions and interests, then it is perhaps still worthy of such
seriousness. Promiscuous treason talk, divorced from the law of treason that
must be enforced, undermines the seriousness of the Constitution’s countertreason program.
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John Marshall,
presiding during the treason trial of Aaron Burr, wrote that treason was “the
most atrocious offence which can be committed against the political body.”45
And in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ex parte Bollman, arising from the
Burr episode, Marshall wrote that “there is no crime which can more excite
and agitate the passions of men than treason.”46 Marshall’s observations
closely track those of other historical commentators that have noted treason’s
unique status. Dante, after all, placed traitors in the Ninth and lowest Circle
of Hell (far below the murderers of the Seventh Circle).47 William
45. U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 13 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
46. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125 (1807).
47. DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO 95-99 (Indiana Critical ed., Mark Musa, ed. & trans., 1995)
(1308); see also Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante’s Inferno and the Social
Construction of Crime, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 787, 808-13 (2001) (discussing Dante’s treatment
of political crimes of betrayal).
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Blackstone, too, described treason as the worst of offenses. The Framers
of the United States Constitution took treason seriously to the point that,
not only did they ensured a fixed definition of it in the Constitution, they
also placed it among the Constitution’s specifically enumerated
impeachable offenses.49
Both history and today’s popular rhetoric, suggest that Americans
understand the rhetorical power of treason or, at least, the dark perception
that accompanies a treason accusation. But what, precisely, is its power
today, its value in American law? There has been no American treason
conviction in well over a half century.50 The terrorist support cases,
however, seem to provide the best modern cases for reviving treason—those
involving American citizens or residents who have joined forces with foreign
terror groups fighting against Americans and American national interests.51
In 2006, the United States Justice Department obtained a treason indictment
against Al-Qaeda adherent Adam Gadahn, but was never able to bring him
to trial (he was later killed in a drone strike).52 In the many other instances
in which Americans have joined foreign terrorist organizations, such as the
Islamic State or Al Qaeda, the Government has preferred to use the material
support statutes rather than treason.53
Perhaps this is due to the heavy evidentiary burden that a treason
prosecution requires of the Government, or perhaps, relatedly, it is because
other criminal laws can achieve the same results—and target the same
conduct—without those special burdens.54 Or perhaps, as George Fletcher
argued, it is because treason’s feudal bases are inconsistent with the
modern liberalism of the criminal law.55 “Betrayal and disloyalty are
grievous moral wrongs,” Fletcher writes, “yet today when the disloyal
commit treason we seem reluctant to punish them.”56 The result, he says,
48. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *75.
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; id. art. II, § 4; see also Erin Creegan, National Security Crime,
3 HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J. 373, 376 (2012) (calling treason “the most serious of all offenses against
the nation”); B. Mitchell Simpson III, Treason and Terror: A Toxic Brew, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2018) (“Treason is a crime of betrayal on the grandest scale possible, worse than any
other major felony, such as murder or arson.”).
50. See Creegan, supra note 49, at 379.
51. Heather J. Williams, et al., TRENDS IN THE DRAW OF AMERICANS TO FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS FROM 9/11 TO TODAY 13-15 (RAND 2018), https://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2545/RAND_RR2545.pdf.
52. First Superseding Indictment, U.S v. Gadahn, SA CR 05-254 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006)
(hereinafter Gadahn Indictment).
53. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A & 2339B; see also J. Richard Broughton, Of Puppets and Terrorism,
62 S.D. L. REV. 682, 689 (2017) (discussing recent examples).
54. Paul T. Crane, Did the Court Kill the Treason Charge?: Reassessing Cramer v. United
States and Its Significance, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 635 (2009).
55. George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1611, 1612 (2004)
56. Id. at 1611.
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is now ambivalence: “we supposedly hate treason, but we are unsure
whether and how we should punish it.”57
Still, notwithstanding the dormancy of treason law, there remain sound
arguments for it, and legitimate cases, like the terrorism support cases, for
consideration. Fletcher’s rationale for thinking more carefully about treason
and its centrality to the development of Anglo-American law is instructive.58
The core of treason, he argued, is breached loyalty, but treason law must
grapple with the relationship between disloyalty and harm: “The evil of
treason consists not only in threatening the security of the state or the
constitutional order, but also in breaching a personal obligation of fidelity.”59
It is the subjective element of treason, particularly Adherence Treason,
which animates its treatment in Anglo-American criminal law theory.
Adherence requires more than “intent to render aid and comfort. In principle,
it requires a deep emotional connection to the enemy.”60
Drawing on these themes of disloyalty, as well as its concurrence with
actions that pose risks of grave harm to American institutions and
constitutional order, a number of contemporary commentators, myself
included, have sought a more robust place for treason in modern American
law.61 Much of this commentary uses the post-September 11 terrorism cases
as the point of departure for considering treason’s continuing relevance, and
understanding the harm to American interests that a “deep emotional
connection with the enemy”62 can produce. Viewing treason in light of
modern terrorism both in the United States and other democratic countries,
Kristen Eichensehr offers a compelling list of the benefits of maintaining a
regime of tolerable but enforced treason law, and responds to Fletcher’s later
concerns about ambivalence toward treason.63 Enforcing treason law can
reinforce social identity and highlight that of the enemy, deter future
treasons, further retribution in the sense of satisfying the political
community’s sense of solidarity, and clarify, and possibly legitimize, a
procedural framework for handling terrorism cases.64 As for Fletcher’s later
concerns about the decline in interest in enforcing loyalty to the state,
Eichensehr counters that treason law remains consistent with our moral
57. Fletcher, Ambivalence, supra note 55, at 1612.
58. George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REV. 193, 206-07 (1982).
59. Id. at 197. For a broader discussion of national allegiance, see Ashwini Vasanthakumar,
Treason, Expatriation, and ‘So-Called’ Americans: Recovering the Role of Allegiance in
Citizenship, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187 (2014).
60. Fletcher, supra note 58, at 207.
61. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 39; Eichensehr, supra note 42, at 1507; Broughton, Snowden
Affair, supra note 42, at 35; Jameson A. Goodell, Comment, The Revival of Treason: Why
Homegrown Terrorists Should be Treated as Traitors, 4 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 311 (2016).
62. Fletcher, supra note 58, at 207.
63. Eichensehr, supra note 42, at 1462-88 (citing Fletcher, Ambivalence, supra note 55).
64. Id. at 1489-95.
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intuitions that condemn other forms of betrayal, and that states are today both
sources of benefits to their people as well as primary players in international
relations, thus supplying strong incentives for punishing disloyalty that could
increase costs to the state or threaten it.65
A theory of national allegiance, then, as opposed to allegiance to a
person or particular political leader, combined with the convergence of
broken loyalty and an overt act of aid to the enemy or levying war, sustains
treason in both the American mind and American law. Loose and careless
treason talk, though, divorced from these concerns and from the relevant
legal text and history that would guide a treason prosecution, diminishes the
seriousness of treason by treating it as a meaningless tool of lower-order
politics. This carries the grave risk that it will be understood as a
mechanism for political advantage or point-scoring, or as the refuge of the
authoritarian strongman, rather than as a serious crime with constitutional
dimension and foundation.
If we value national loyalty as an object of the law—meaning we take
seriously the notion that American criminal law ought to punish specific
forms of national betrayal, so as to not only promote fidelity, but also to help
protect the Nation against threats to its security when the bonds of loyalty
are broken in favor of those who would harm us—then public discourse
about treason must be sufficiently responsible for taking a severe crime
seriously. Using treason as a mere political weapon, however, erodes the
seriousness of criminalizing national betrayal by giving primacy to low
politics.
B. Respecting the History and Limits of Treason in America

Second, the Framers crafted treason law carefully, ensuring that it
would be far narrower than treason under English law, more difficult to
prosecute, and less likely to result in abuses of power exerted against
political opponents and dissenters.66 But today’s treason talk tends to
obscure the limited nature of American treason law.
English history is littered with examples of abuses of power connected
to treason.67 As Steve Vladeck writes, treason accusations were used as “a
means of suppressing political dissent and punishing political opponents for
crimes as trivial as contemplating a king’s future death (what was known as
‘compassing’) or speaking ill of the king (“lèse majesté”).”68 Prominent
65. Eichensehr, supra note 42, at 1486-88.
66. J. Willard Hurst, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES (1971).
67. J. G. BELLAMY, THE LAW OF TREASON IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 10237 (1970) (giving examples of treason’s extension after the enactment of 25 Edward III).
68. Steve Vladeck, Americans Have Forgotten What ‘Treason’ Actually Means – and How It
Can Be Abused, NBC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2018, 9:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/
americans-have-forgotten-what-treason-actually-means-how-it-can-ncna848651 (Vladeck also
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constitutional framer, Rufus King, observed that the limits of American
treason “will readily be approved by every man who is acquainted with the
vindictive spirit that, at different times in the History of England, has
animated the ascendant faction against political adversaries.”69
Viewing treason from the time of the Constitution’s adoption, J. Willard
Hurst supplies a compelling analysis of the abuses that prompted the
“restrictive policy” of treason in America.70 Hurst surveys the Treason
Clause’s development in Philadelphia in 1787, finding that debate on the
definition “seems clearly to establish a general agreement on the wisdom of
limiting the scope of the offense in all doubtful cases,”71 even placing the
Clause in Article III rather than Article I, so as to signal that the definition
was constitutionally fixed and not subject to congressional tinkering.72 But,
why so restrictive? Hurst notes the concerns at the time of the Constitution’s
framing regarding oppressive uses of treason. Describing the “particular
types of oppression which the proponents of the treason clause feared under
loose definitions of the offense,”73 Hurst finds that “the fear most in mind
was abuse of ‘treason’ for the building or upholding of domestic political
faction.”74 He adds that the restrictive policy was “most consciously based
on the fear of extension of the offense to penalize certain types of conduct
familiar in the normal processes of the struggle for domestic political or
economic power.”75
Notably, Hurst identifies the same kind of loose treason rhetoric with
which we contend today, and concludes that the Framers knew its dangers:
“[i]t is plain that in 1787 men appreciated the potentialities of ‘treason’ as a
political epithet.”76 Madison, for example, lamented in The Federalist
Papers that “new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines
by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free governments, have
usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other.”77 And Marshall
refers to the fact that Henry VIII had two of his wives executed “for alleged adultery on the ground
that such adultery was, itself, ‘treason.’”).
69. Hurst, supra note 66, at 143 (quoting 5 RUFUS KING, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
RUFUS KING 73-75 (1898)).
70. Id. at 126.
71. Id. at 134.
72. Id. at 139. Hurst also notes the influence of James Wilson, generally, and specifically
with respect to the definition of treason as a limit on Congress. Id. at 136. Wilson’s law lectures
in the early 1790s emphasized the point. Citing Montesquieu, Wilson said that “if the crime of
treason be indeterminate, this alone is sufficient to make any government degenerate into arbitrary
power.” 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 663 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (1791).
Americans, though, “are secured effectually from even legislative tyranny.” Id.
73. Hurst, supra note 66, at 140.
74. Id. at 141.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 150.
77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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wrote in Burr that treason “is the charge which is most capable of being
employed as the instrument of those malignant and vindictive passions
which may rage in the bosoms of contending parties struggling for power.”78
The Supreme Court has also taken careful note of this history. In
Cramer v. United States, one of its most important treason decisions from
the twentieth century, the Court reminds us that the Declaration of
Independence accused King George III of “transporting us beyond Seas to
be tried for pretended offenses.”79 Those who participated in the
Constitutional Convention, the Court wrote, were “familiar with government
in the Old World, and they looked back upon a long history of use and abuse
of the treason charge.”80 After surveying English treason prosecutions, and
some of the major treatise writers on English treason, the Court explained
that “the basic law of treason in this country was framed by men who . . .
were taught by experience and by history to fear abuse of the treason charge
almost as much as they fared treason itself.”81
Rhetorical uses of treason that are divorced from its narrow
understanding in American law, and pursue questionable and even
nonsensical applications, undermine the central purposes for restrictively
defining treason, and thus raise the same concerns that compelled the
Framers to treat the definition of treason with special care.
Moreover, if popular use of treason creates the impression that it is
broader, or encompasses more action than it does as a matter of constitutional
reality, then the public will fail to appreciate the virtues of a limited treason
law. More dangerous still, prosecutors may be inclined to pursue treason
charges of dubious legality, succumbing to pressures created by popular
passion. Alternatively, prosecutors may become too cautious, consciously
avoiding the impression that they are endeavoring to satisfy public
sentiment, and thereby avoid charging in legitimate treason cases. As
Vladeck argues, “the more we use the t-word to refer to conduct that doesn’t
remotely resemble the constitutional definition, the more we are—
willfully—turning a blind eye to the sordid history of treatment that led to
its unique treatment in the U.S. Constitution.”82 For this reason, responsible
constitutional discourse about treason requires acknowledging its limits, as
well as its power.

78. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 13.
79. 325 U.S. 1, 14 (1945). The Court explained that, though vague, this accusation actually
referred back to statements made during the Continental Congress in 1774. Id. at 14-15 and n.20.
80. Id. at 15.
81. Id. at 21.
82. Vladeck, supra note 68.
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C. The Problem of Presidential Power

Third, in light of the foregoing reasons for prudence in employing
treason rhetoric, and given the unique position of the president in the
American constitutional government, presidential deployment of treason
language raises special concerns and requires further caution.
The President sits atop the American military command structure,83
oversees all federal criminal prosecutions, and shall “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”84 When, therefore, the President speaks on a matter
of federal criminal law or one of constitutional interpretation, his voice is allimportant. And treason involves both matters. If the President accuses
someone of treason, he is effectively asserting that the person either (1)
levied war against the United States, in which case he is drawing a legal
conclusion about the sufficiency of the relevant overt act of war-levying, or
(2) gave aid and comfort to the enemy, in which case he is drawing a legal
conclusion about the sufficiency of the overt act that would constitute the
prohibited aid, but also giving notice to the entire world about who is an
American enemy (more on that later).85 Presidential assignment of the
“enemy” label is especially notable in light of his constitutional status as the
United States Commander-in-Chief. Therefore, his use of treason
terminology can carry significant and perhaps far-reaching legal
consequences. This is no area in which to be casual, particularly if the
speaker has power to direct and control criminal prosecutions, and give
orders to American military forces about who is an enemy subject to the laws
of war.
Of course, we know that past American presidents have contended with
treason. President George Washington’s administration obtained the first
treason convictions under the Constitution—arising from the Whiskey
Rebellion, on an expansive theory of “levying war”—only to see
Washington subsequently pardon the convicts.86 President Thomas
Jefferson not only accused Aaron Burr of treason, but closely managed and
even participated in Burr’s federal treason prosecution.87 “Jefferson had
become obsessed with Burr and ruthlessly kept up the pressure for his
conviction,” writes Willard Sterne Randall, “despite the lack of evidence of
treason.”88 Randall explains that Jefferson “never read the trial record or

83. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (making president “Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy”).
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
85. See infra Section III.
86. Hurst, supra note 66, at 196.
87. John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential
Power, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1435, 1442-43 (1999).
88. WILLARD STERNE RANDALL, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A LIFE 576 (1993).
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weighed the evidence presented against Burr,” and when Marshall ruled
that Burr could not be convicted of treason and had to be released on bond
to face only a misdemeanor charge, Jefferson thought that Marshall was
simply motivated by politics.90 Similarly, Lyndon B. Johnson privately
reflected on Nixon’s conduct, which must be understood within the context
of the 1968 presidential election.91
President Trump’s treason rhetoric is notable both for the sheer number
of publicly leveled treason accusations, as well as for the particularly
attenuated relationship of those accusations to the law of treason. As of the
spring of 2019, President Trump had accused numerous individuals—and
groups of people, and entire media outlets—of treason;92 or, in one instance
a “virtual act of treason,” a notion he left undefined.93 Some of those are
enumerated above, but even that list is incomplete. After an administration
official crafted an anonymous opinion piece that was critical of the President
and published in The New York Times in September 2018, the President said
publicly that the Times had committed treason by publishing the piece.94 In
April of 2019, while speaking to reporters prior to a meeting with the
President of South Korea, President Trump said that “Democrats” were
laughing internally about the “hoax” (as the President likes to describe the
Russian interference investigation), and that “it’s called politics, but this is
dirty politics and this is actually treason.”95
By accusing—or at least appearing to accuse—others of treason for
merely expressing disagreement with, opposition to, or antipathy toward
him, President Trump’s use of the term often misunderstands even the very
basics of American treason law, and is ignorant of its troubled history in the
89. Randall, supra note 88, at 578.
90. Id. at 576-78; see also Yoo, supra note 87, at 1442 (describing the “intensely partisan lens
through which Jefferson viewed events, which caused the President to suspect that his political
enemies were engaged in a vast conspiracy to support Burr”).
91. Kristoff, supra note 1.
92. Zachary Basu, The 24 Times Trump Has Accused Somebody of “Treason”, AXIOS (June
16, 2019), https://www.axios.com/trump-treason-russia-investigation-new-york-times-e1660029c73c-4809-8bd5-8988f1ed4fda.html.
93. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 15, 2019, 6:15 PM), https://twit
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1140065300186128384 (stating that The New York Times
committed a “virtual act of treason” by publishing a story concerning American cyberattacks on
Russian electric grid); see also Marina Pitofsky, NYT Publisher: Trump Crossed ‘Dangerous Line’
in Accusing Outlet of ‘Treason’, THE HILL (June 19, 2019, 8:53 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/
blog-briefing-room/news/449441-nyt-publisher-trump-crossed-dangerous-line-in-accusing-outlet
(describing The NewYork Times’ response).
94. Allie Malloy, Trump on New York Times Op-Ed: ‘You Could Call It Treason,’ CNN (Sept.
6, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/06/politics/trump-new-york-times-op-ed/index.html.
95. President Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump and President Moon Jae-in of
the Republic of Korea Before Bilateral Meeting (Apr. 11, 2019, 12:19 PM), https://www.whiteho
use.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-moon-jae-republic-korea-bilater
al-meeting/.

3 - BROUGHTON MACROED 11-14-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

318

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

12/12/2019 2:27 PM

[Vol. 47:2

hands of those who control prosecutions. Indeed, the President appears to
be relying on a kind of democratized version of compassing or, more likely,
a kind of lèse majesté doctrine for the American presidency—both of which
were obviously and thoroughly rejected in our Constitution—by suggesting
loyalty to the Chief Executive that could be criminally enforceable as
treason.96 But in the American constitutional system, “[w]e do not regard
the president as the embodiment of the state or as the object of our
allegiance.”97 The Court has observed, one of the chief dangers against
which the founding generation sought to protect the American people was
“[p]erversion by established authority to repress peaceful political
opposition.”98 This could be accomplished by “‘[c]ompassing’ and like
loose concepts,” which “had been useful tools for tyranny.”99
Nothing in the text or history of American treason would permit its
application to those who simply oppose the President’s policies or his
election, who work for the election of someone else, or who seek to
undermine him in favor of some other policy goal or perceived national
interest. Indeed, the narrow definition of treason adopted by the Framers
was designed to assure that mere political dissent was not subject to treason
prosecution. “The idea that loyalty will ultimately be given to a government
only so long as it deserves loyalty and that opposition to its abuses is not
treason,” Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote in the Cramer case, “has made our
government tolerant of opposition based on differences of opinion that in
some parts of the world would have kept the hangman busy.”100
President Trump’s hyper-reliance on “treason,” then, cannot be taken
seriously. In fact, it is not clear that he wants it to be: despite the President’s
rhetoric, the Justice Department has not obtained any indictments for treason
during the Trump Administration, and even United States Attorney General
William Barr has acknowledged that the President’s treason accusations are
insufficient “as a legal matter.”101 Yet, the accusation alone carries unique
meaning when uttered by a president because 1) he has the power to
influence what federal prosecutors do;102 and 2) mere accusations may
suppress dissent or deter other speech by those who fear he will wield his
power to compel treason charges, even if he ultimately does not.
96. See Vladeck, supra note 68 (describing “lèse majesté” as “speaking ill of the king”).
97. Fletcher, supra note 58, at 199.
98. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 27.
99. Id. at 28.
100. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 21.
101. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Does Barr Think Obama Officials Committed Treason? “Not
as a Legal Matter, No.”, CBS NEWS (May 30, 2019, 6:30 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
william-barr-interview-ag-says-he-doesnt-think-obama-officials-committed-treason-as-a-legal-ma
tter-exclusive/.
102. For a favorable view of such authority, see Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (2005).
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One cannot help but be reminded of President Trump’s similarly loose
rhetoric about imposing the death penalty.103 In one instance, after Sayfullo
Saipov allegedly killed eight people by running over them on a bike path in
New York City,104 the President immediately Tweeted that “NYC terrorist
was happy as he asked to hang ISIS flag in his hospital room. He killed 8
people, badly injured 12. SHOULD GET DEATH PENALTY!”105 Saipov
later challenged the Government’s decision to seek the death penalty,
arguing that the Attorney General was left with little choice after the
President’s Tweet.106 Although at the time I predicted Saipov’s challenge
and argued that it should fail,107 and it did, I also analyzed the dangers to the
federal death penalty review process when a president recklessly demands a
particular outcome before all of the facts and evidence have been assessed
by the Justice Department’s professional prosecutors, death penalty experts,
and the Attorney General.108
His treason rhetoric creates similar
awkwardness for prosecutors in his administration.
As one commentator stated, the restrictive nature of American treason
was meant to guard “against the possibility that Americans would one day
elect a man so morally weak and corrupt that he would falsely accuse political
enemies of treason.”109 To some degree, then, we must place our trust not only
in the constitutional definition of treason, but in the good judgment of federal
prosecutors, who should take Article III of the United States Constitution more
seriously than they take a president’s Twitter account.110
This is not to say that treason talk, even specific accusations from a
sitting President, are always or necessarily vicious. Discerning observers
may well find that treason is still a viable and legitimate option in some
cases. Additionally, presidents can, and ought to, contribute to important
national conversations about constitutional meaning and their own role, as
well as that of other institutions, in constitutional government.111 Indeed,
103. J. Richard Broughton, The Federal Death Penalty and Civil Rights Enforcement, 67 AM.
U. L. REV. 1611, 1622-25 (2018).
104. Indictment, U.S. v. Saipov, No. 17cr722 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed Nov. 21, 2017).
105. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2017, 8:43 PM), https://twit
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/925931294705545216.
106. Defendant’s Motion to Preclude Government from Seeking the Death Penalty, U.S. v.
Saipov, No. 17cr722 at 8 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed Sept. 6, 2018).
107. Broughton, supra note 103, at 1626-27.
108. Id.
109. Conor Friedersdorf, A President Falsely Charging ‘Treason’ Is What the Founders
Feared, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/trum
p-treason/586915/.
110. By all indications, this is thankfully true of the Justice Department under Trump. See
Montoya-Galvez, supra note 101.
111. JOSEPH M. BESSETTE & JEFFREY K. TULIS, On the Constitution, Politics, and the
Presidency, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY 13-27 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey K. Tulis
eds., 2009).
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presidential rhetoric is at its zenith when it pursues responsible constitutional
discourse, seizing upon the weight of the Constitution, situating the president
as an authoritative defender and enforcer of the constitutional order, and
affirmatively promoting the fulfillment of his oath of office.112 If criminal
prosecution for national disloyalty remains desirable, and I have suggested
here why it may be, then a responsible public conversation about treason law
and treasonous conduct may not only keep treason alive, but actually aid its
development and clarify its contours. The challenge is to identify the
necessarily narrow category of persons for whom the treason charge is
constitutionally fitting. That is no easy task and requires appreciation of the
challenges posed by an underdeveloped American treason law.

III. Know Your Enemy
Despite the rhetorical overuse of “treason” as a political weapon, not
every use of treason lacks legal seriousness. In cases where a person with
allegiance to America has joined forces with a foreign state or cohesive
group engaged in hostile action against the United States, with the specific
intent to betray the country, a treason accusation gains greater legitimacy
(again, consider the terrorism support cases involving Americans).113 Still,
if Adherence Treason is the operative theory of criminality, the question
remains as to whether the person who owes American allegiance is aiding an
“enemy.” I do not wish to conclusively determine here which countries or
groups should be regarded as enemies—that is a determination that
circumstances, and time, may alter. Rather, I wish only to demonstrate how
and why any public narrative about treason should account for this
complicated constitutional problem.
A. Uncovering the Actual Hostility Test

Little case law or scholarly authority exists on the question of who,
precisely, is an “enemy” of the United States for purposes of treason. Several
English and early American sources address the question generally. And
because those sources would likely have been influential to the generation
that framed the Treason Clause, they stand as the best authorities on the
subject. Carlton F. W. Larson, who has emerged a leading contemporary
voice on American treason law, canvasses these authorities in an excellent
piece from 2006, written in the wake of the September 11 attacks when

112. JEFFREY K. TULIS, Revising the Rhetorical Presidency, in BEYOND THE RHETORICAL
PRESIDENCY 10-13 (Martin J. Medhurst ed., 1996); see also J. Richard Broughton, The Inaugural
Address as Constitutional Statesmanship, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 265 (2010) (examining inaugural
addresses as opportunities for constitutionalist rhetoric).
113. See WILLIAMS, ET AL., supra note 51, at 11-13.
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114

treason began a brief reemergence in legal scholarship. Larson notes that
the Soviet Union would not have been regarded as an enemy during the Cold
War years,115 and, most recently, he has offered commentary as to why he
believes that today’s Russia is not an American enemy, notwithstanding
Russia’s alleged election interference efforts (instead, he argues that we are
formally at peace with Russia, and “a treason prosecution naming Russia as
an enemy would amount to a declaration of war”).116 His argument is a
sensible one, and likely correct. I wish to not only illuminate this research,
but to place it in the context of the relevant authorities and of what we have
recently learned about Russian active measures in and against the United
States.
The easiest case for proving an “enemy” is a state actor against whom
there is a declared war or some specific legislative authorization for the use
of force. So, for example, Germany and Italy in 1941;117 Great Britain in
1812.118 Beyond this, the question becomes trickier. To determine the scope
of the Constitution’s reach on this matter, a further taxonomy is helpful: state
actors against whom there is not a declared war (e.g., Russia, China, Iran);
non-state actors against whom there is a declared war or congressionally
approved authorization for the use of military force (e.g., Al-Qaeda); and
non-state actors against whom there is no declared war or specific legislative
authorization, but against whom the United States is engaged in hostile
action (e.g., likely the Islamic State).
I believe Larson and other commentators have correctly argued that the
latter two categories are sufficient for enemy status.119 Admittedly, there is
continued controversy regarding these categories.120 Even the United States
114. Larson, supra note 39, at 915-16.
115. Id. at 920.
116. Carlton F. W. Larson, Five Myths About Treason, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-treason/2017/02/17/8b9eb3a8-f460-11e6a9b0-ecee7ce475fc_story.html?utm_term=.5880c09d0443.
117. For a brief summary of the congressional declaration of war against Germany and Italy
on December 11, 1941, see Andrew Glass, Congress declares war on Nazi Germany and Italy,
December 11, 1941, POLITICO (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/11/cong
ress-declares-war-on-nazi-germany-and-italy-dec-11-1941-282980. The declaration followed
Adolph Hitler’s declaration of war against the United States, which was followed by Italy’s, and
came three days after the declaration of war against Japan following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Id.
118. For an account of the deliberations leading to the declaration of war against Great Britain
in 1812, and President Madison’s role, see RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY
526-33 (1990). Madison’s war message focused on Britain’s belligerence in attempting to protect
“‘the monopoly which she covets for her own commerce and navigation, . . . a commerce polluted
by . . . forgeries and perjuries.’” Id. at 527. The House approved the declaration 79 to 49; the
Senate approved it 19 to 13. Id. at 528-29.
119. Larson, supra note 39, at 920; cf. Broughton, Snowden Affair, supra note 42, at 24 n.116
(acknowledging the “better understanding” that the Islamic State should be regarded as an enemy).
120. 4 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 663 (15th ed. 2016) (“‘[E]nemies,’ as used in the
constitutional definition of treason, is limited to the citizens or subjects of nations who are engaged
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Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel grappled with this problem
when trying to determine whether it could bring treason charges against John
Walker Lindh, an American citizen captured in Afghanistan, where he was
fighting for the Taliban shortly after the September 11 attacks.121 The Justice
Department eventually resolved this question in favor of finding enemy
status for non-state actors when it obtained a treason indictment against AlQaeda spokesman Gadahn, and specifically named Al-Qaeda as an enemy.122
Assuming this is the correct approach, this leaves the second category—state
actors against whom there is no declared war, but who maintain an
adversarial posture toward the United States—as an especially problematic
category. Unfortunately, this category has captured much of the attention in
today’s treason talk.
One possible theory of “enemy” status that has emerged in the
Trump-Russia-Treason conversation is that we are not in a declared war
against Russia.123 That is, of course, true, but might not be dispositive of
the question.
Sir Michael Foster’s 1762 Discourse on High Treason provided the
following analysis pursuant to the Statute of 25 Edward III, which defined
treason as adhering to the “King’s enemies in his realm, giving to them aid
and comfort in the realm or elsewhere”:124
States in Actual Hostility with Us, though no War be solemnly
declared, are Enemies within the meaning of the Act. And therefore
in an Indictment on the Clause of Adhering to the King’s Enemies,
it is sufficient to aver that the Prince or State Adhered to is an
Enemy, without shewing any War Proclaimed. And the Fact,
whether War or No, is triable by the Jury; and Publick Notoriety is
sufficient Evidence of the Fact. And if the Subject of a Foreign
Prince in Amity with Us, invadeth the Kingdom without

in open war against the United States. It is not sufficient that a ‘cold war’ exists or that a particular
nation is hostile to or unfriendly toward the United States.”) (emphasis added).
121. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Possible
Criminal Charges Against American Citizen Who Was A Member of the al Qaeda Terrorist
Organization or the Taliban Militia, at 9 (Dec. 21, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default
/files/olc/legacy/2009/12/30/aclu-ii-122101.pdf (Walker was never charged with treason). The
Memorandum also concedes that treason charges for Walker might fail because of the
Constitution’s two-witness rule. Id. at 8.
122. Gadahn Indictment, supra note 52, at 3.
123. See Larson, Five Myths, supra note 116. Larson acknowledges that the absence of
declared war would require consideration of whether we are in a state of “open” war with
Russia. Id.
124. Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. III, ch. 2 (1351).
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Commission from his Sovereign, He is an Enemy. And a Subject of
England adhering to Him is a Traitor within this Clause of the Act.125
Sir Matthew Hale offered a similar explanation, acknowledging that a
state of hostility could exist between states where there is a de facto war, in
which case the states are enemies of each other.126 These descriptions of the
English understanding of “enemy” did not require formally declared war in
every instance—only open warfare, or actual hostilities.
Nor did it require that the enemy be a state actor.127 Blackstone, in
commenting upon the meaning of this portion of 25 Edward III, stated that
“[b]y enemies are here understood the subjects of foreign powers with whom
we are at open war.”128 But he then stated that “[a]s to foreign pirates or
robbers, who may happen to invade our coasts, without any open hostilities
between their nation and our own, and without any commission from any
prince or state at enmity with the crown of Great Britain, the giving them
any assistance is also clearly treasonous.”129
Larson contends that “while the evidence is limited, these English
definitions appear to have been widely accepted in late-eighteenth century
America.”130 Under the American Constitution, James Wilson repeated
Foster’s understanding in his law lectures.131 William Rawle—the federal
prosecutor whose more expansive understanding of treason led to two
treason convictions in the Whiskey Rebellion trials132—wrote of the
distinction between treason in a monarchy and in a republic.133 Noting that
in a republic, subversion and destruction of government requires a
contingent, rather than a single person,134 Rawle states that “the citizen who
unites himself with a hostile nation, waging war against his country, is guilty
of a crime of which the foreign army is innocent; with him it is treason, with
his associates it is, in the code of nations, legitimate warfare.”135 Here,
Rawle does not appear to limit treasonous conduct to those who adhere only
to a country that is waging war against the nation. Rather, he appears to be
125. MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION OF OYER
AND TERMINER AND GOAL DELIVERY FOR THE TRIAL OF REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746 IN THE
COUNTY OF SURRY, AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES, TO WHICH ARE ADDED DISCOURSES UPON A
FEW BRANCHES OF THE CROWN LAW 219 (1762).
126. Hale, supra note 39, at 162.
127. Larson, supra note 39, at 916.
128. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 82-83.
129. BLACKSTONE, supra note 128, at 83.
130. Larson, supra note 39, at 916. Larson cautions against misreading The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), to say otherwise. Id. at 918-19.
131. WILSON, supra note 72, at 668.
132. Larson, supra note 39, at 904.
133. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
141 (2d. ed. 1829).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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using this simply as one example of how treason inheres in the duty of
allegiance. Nevertheless, it is important that Rawle identifies a “hostile
nation” in this context.136 Later, as Larson notes, in the midst of the Civil
War, Justice Stephen Johnson Field instructed a jury using the principles of
treason law set forth by the dominant English authorities, defining “enemies”
as “subjects of a foreign power in a state of open hostility with us.”137
What, then, is meant by “actual” or “open” “hostility”? Is a “hostile”
adversary one at open, declared, conventional war with the United States, or
can hostility be measured in other ways besides cannon fire or the drawing
of bayonets or other traditional uses of force? The question, then, is whether
the relevant hostilities must be armed ones. Blackstone, for example, clearly
believed that piracy and robbery could amount to the kinds of hostilities that
could create enemy status, such that aiding them was treason.138
The legal definitions of “enemy” in modern American law are
noteworthy.139 For example, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917
defines an enemy as any government with which the United States is at war,
or anyone who resides within any nation with whom the United States is at
war, or who does business with any nation with whom the United States is
at war.140 The Act also permits the President to proclaim one as an enemy
who resides in or does business with any nation that is at war with the United
States.141 The “spoils of war” statutes, which concern the transfer of enemy
movable property obtained during war, create yet another definition.
There, enemy is defined as “any country, government, group, or person
that has been engaged in hostilities, whether or not lawfully authorized,
with the United States.”142 Additionally, the military commission statutes
define an “unprivileged enemy belligerent” as one who has engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners, or was part of Al-Qaeda at the time of the
relevant offense.143 The statute further defines “hostilities” as a conflict
“subject to the laws of war.”144

136. Rawle, supra note 133.
137. Larson, supra note 39, at 920 (citing U.S. v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 22 (Field, Circuit
Justice, C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (No. 15,254)).
138. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *83.
139. For a helpful analysis of various statutory sources of the term “enemy,” see Stephen I.
Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property, and Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
963 (2007).
140. 50 U.S.C. §4302.
141. Id.
142. 50 U.S.C. § 2204(2) (West 1994).
143. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (West 2009).
144. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(9) (West 2009).
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These statutes offer a window into modern thinking about enemy status,
though they may be of limited use in determining the understanding of the
word “enemy” that would have prevailed at the time of the Treason Clause’s
framing. While there may well be significant overlap between modern
national security statutes and the Constitution’s use of the term “enemy,” it
is also possible that one may be an “enemy” for purposes of one of these
statutes but perhaps not an “enemy” for purposes of the Treason Clause.
Therefore, while modern statutory law can provide a definitive legal
understanding of who an “enemy” is, or when “hostilities” exist, they do so
only in the contexts in which those statutes were written and apply today.
They tell us little about what the Framers understood when they used
“enemy” in 1787, or even what the Reconstruction-era framers understood
when they used the term in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The most relevant authorities, then, appear to emphasize actual
hostilities, and no dominant strain of American legal thought appears to be
at odds with this understanding. If that is the proper understanding of what
triggers “enemy” status for purposes of Adherence Treason, then we must
determine which countries or groups have engaged in actual hostilities with
the United States.
B. Applying the Actual Hostilities Test: Adversary, Frenemy, or Enemy?

If we accept actual hostilities as the relevant standard, then any public
narrative about treason must at least account for such hostilities before an
accusation of Adherence Treason can be taken seriously.
It is unlikely that Russia is a “friend” of the United States. Perhaps, as
some have suggested even before the 2016 elections, the Russian regime is
merely a “frenemy,” an adversary, but one with whom with which we share
common interests and goals.145 After all, we enjoy diplomatic relations with
Russia, and endeavor to ally with them for certain strategic purposes, such
as combatting terrorism.146 But the United States has imposed significant
economic sanctions against Russia, including sanctions leveled as a direct
result of its 2016 active measures campaign.147 Moreover, the indictments
from February and July 2018 name both an arm of the Russian government,

145. Editorial, Putin as America’s Frenemy, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov. 17, 2015, 3:30 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-russia-syria-islamic-state-edit-1118-20151117-story.html.
146. Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html (pledging to work
for peace and friendship with Russia and noting Russia’s experience with terrorism); Steve Holland,
Trump Says He Would Consider Alliance With Russia Over Islamic State, REUTERS (July 25, 2016,
2:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-idUSKCN1052CJ.
147. Matthew Lee & Josh Lederman, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on 13 Russians Indicted By
Robert Mueller, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 15, 2018, 11:11 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/po
litics/u-s-imposes-sanctions-on-13-russians-indicted-by-robert-mueller.
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as well as Russian government officials acting at the direction of Russia’s
head of state.148 Today, top American law enforcement and intelligence
officials are confident that Russia—as well as China and Iran—continues to
engage in active measures to influence American governance and harm
American interests.149
In March 2017, during a hearing on Russian active measures before the
United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (“HPSCI”), the following colloquy occurred between
Representative Jackie Speier of California and FBI Director James Comey
and Admiral Michael S. Rogers, second commander of the United States
Cyber Command:
SPEIER: [S]o my first question to each of you is, is Russia our
adversary?
Mr. Comey?
COMEY: Yes.
SPEIER: Mr. Rogers?
ROGERS: Yes.
SPEIER: Is—do they intend to do us harm?
ROGERS: They intend to ensure, I believe, that they gain advantage at
our expense.
SPEIER: Director Comey?
COMEY: Yes, I want to be—harm can have many meanings. They’re
an adversary, so they want to resist us, oppose us, undermine us, in lots
of different ways.150
This colloquy was then followed by another, in which Representative
Speier introduced the notion of “hybrid warfare,” which she understood as
encompassing a combination of conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and
cyber warfare.151 When asked whether he believed that Russia was engaged
in such warfare, Director Comey stated,
148. Internet Research Agency Indictment, supra note 15; Netyshko Indictment, supra note 16.
149. Daniel R. Coats, Statement on the IC’s Response to EO 13848 on Imposing Certain
Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a U.S. Election, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L
INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-re
leases-2018/item/1933-dni-coats-statement-on-the-intelligence-community-s-response-to-executi
ve-order-13848-on-imposing-certain-sanctions-in-the-event-of-foreign-interference-in-a-united-st
ates-election; Securing U.S. Election Infrastructure and Protecting Political Discourse: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement of Adam S. Hickey, Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen. of the United States), https://docs.hous
e.gov/meetings/GO/GO06/20190522/109538/HHRG-116-GO06-Wstate-HickeyA-20190522.pdf.
150. Russian Actives Measures Investigation, Hearing Before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017).
151. Id.
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I don’t think I would use the term warfare. I think you’d—you
would want to ask experts in the definition of war. They’re engaged
in a multifaceted campaign of active measures to undermine our
democracy and hurt one of the candidates and—and hope to help
one of the other candidates.152
Admiral Rogers then indicated his agreement with Director Comey’s
response.153
These exchanges before HPSCI suggest that while we may not be at
“war” with Russia, the Russian regime is nonetheless engaged in activities
designed to disrupt the processes of American democratic governance in
ways that would benefit Russian national interests, and thus create risks for
American national security. Because we know from early authorities that
declared war is not a prerequisite for enemy status, these responses by
Comey and Rogers do not rule out such a status for Russia, but certainly do
not confirm it. The hesitation of both witnesses against acknowledging that
Russia is engaged in warfare—even while conceding Russia’s adversarial
posture—suggests that both men wished to be cautious in characterizing
Russia’s status. Perhaps that caution was meant to avoid interference with,
or confusion in, the conduct of American foreign policy. Perhaps it was
meant to avoid the legal consequences of being seen by others as asserting
publicly that the United States Government believes that Russia is an enemy.
Perhaps it was meant to mitigate the breadth of Representative Speier’s
characterization of Russian activities: after all, there seems to be little
evidence that Russia is engaged in “conventional” warfare with the United
States, even if it is engaged in irregular warfare or cyber warfare. While
these responses do not definitively determine whether Russia is an
“enemy”—and seem sufficiently cautious that they make that conclusion less
likely—they nonetheless describe Russia’s efforts to influence American
politics in an aggressive and adversarial way.
Moving then, from friend to adversary to frenemy to enemy requires
determining whether a nation or group has engaged in the kind of actual
hostilities toward the United States that the English writers on treason
required. But the kind of adversary that America faces in, for example,
Russia, does not lend itself easily to traditional understandings of the term
“actual hostilities.” Once we depart from formally declared wars, or, in
contemporary American government, specific congressional authorizations

152. Russian Actives Measures Investigation, Hearing Before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017).
153. Id.
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154

for the use of military force, relations get tricky in modern political life.
Perhaps, then, our thinking about actual hostility must go beyond
conventional warfare, armed action, force, or violence, and account for the
distinctive nature of modern international relations, warfare, and hostile
action between adversaries.
Most notably, this new thinking about actual hostilities must account
for harmful cyber-activity. In other words, when cyber-attacks are the basis
for the adversarial nature of the relationship with another country, the
question for treason purposes may well turn on whether those cyber-attacks
would be the functional equivalent of an act subject to the laws of warfare.155
Scholars have grappled with similar questions, albeit outside the context of
American treason, in the fields of warfare and international law.156
Nonetheless, as current FBI Director Christopher Wray testified to the
United States Senate Judiciary Committee in July 2019, “[v]irtually every
national security threat . . . the FBI faces is cyber-based or facilitated.”157
A single authoritative answer to the precise question of whether or when
cyber-activity amounts to actual hostility for purposes of defining an
“enemy” pursuant to American treason law seems, for now, elusive. The
broad term “cyber-attack” requires more detail (beyond the scope of this
particular Article), and both international law and the law of war remain in
development on this matter.158 Still, the United States Department of
Defense’s Law of War Manual supplies some authority regarding when a
154. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
155. Carlton F. W. Larson, Treason and Cyberwarfare, TAKE CARE (July 27, 2017)
https://takecareblog.com/blog/treason-and-cyberwarfare.
156. See generally, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt, ed. 2017); Jeffrey T. Biller & Michael N. Schmitt,
Classification of Cyber Capabilities and Operations as Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare,
95 INT’L L. STUD. 179 (2019); Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L.
REV. 817 (2012); Jack Goldsmith, How Cyber Changes the Laws of War, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 129
(2013); Antonia Chayes, Rethinking Warfare: The Ambiguity of Cyber Attacks, 6 HARV. NAT’L
SEC. J. 474 (2015); Michael Gervais, Cyber-Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 525 (2012); Cmdr. Todd C. Huntley, Controlling the Use of Force in Cyber Space: The
Application of the Law of Armed Conflict During a Time of Fundamental Change in the Nature of
Warfare, 60 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (2010).
157. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (opening statement of Christopher A. Wray, Dir. of the FBI)
(Director Wray explained the scope of these cyber-threats, noting that they “hold our critical
infrastructure at risk and harm our economy.”).
158. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 16.1
(rev. 2016) (hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL) (“Precisely how the law of war applies to
cyber operations is not well-settled, and aspects of the law in this area continue to develop,
especially as new cyber capabilities are developed and States determine their views in response to
such developments.”); Biller & Schmitt, supra note 156, at 181 (detailing conflicts among
authorities on when an “attack” has occurred); Hathaway et al., supra note 156, at 821 (offering a
concise definition of cyber-attack), TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, r.92, at 415-20 (same)

3 - BROUGHTON MACROED 11-14-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/12/2019 2:27 PM

Winter 2020]CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURCE AND THE RHETORIC OF TREASON

329

cyber-attack is subject to the law of war, and thus, arguably sufficient to
constitute actual hostilities for purposes of defining an enemy.159 The
Manual acknowledges the Pentagon’s recognition of cyberspace as a domain
of warfare, and considers cyber-attacks with respect to both ius ad bellum
and ius in bello.160
Neither the Manual nor other authorities provide a definitive or
exhaustive list of cyber-attacks that would trigger the laws of war or justify
the use of force in response to cyber-attacks. There seems to be agreement
that using a cyber-incursion to merely conduct intelligence activity, to
engage in a propaganda campaign, or to promote “fake news” likely does not
rise to the level of an attack that would trigger the law of war.161 However,
other uses of cyber-capabilities might constitute such an act, such as
compromising infrastructure in ways that would significantly affect the
functionality of a weapon or weapon system.162 Scholars have also noted the
problem of attribution, also noted in the Law of War Manual,163 in which
state actors avoid responsibility for cyber-activity by shifting blame to
private actors.164
This is but a small taste of the various problems that must be resolved
with respect to the overlap of cyber-activity and the laws of war. Such
resolution is far beyond the scope of this Article. But the point is that modern
cyber-activity could constitute the kinds of hostilities that would be
sufficient to implicate treason law’s “enemy” status.
Of course, even when we consider these more modern variations on
hostile action, “enemy” status likely must also account for the American
response. Is it enough that the United States has been subject to hostile
action, sufficient to trigger the lawful use of force in response? Or is
“enemy” status attained only once the United States renders a hostile
response? Consider, for example, a recent incident in June 2019, in which
the United States accused the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps of using

159.
160.

DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 16.1 et seq.
Id. §§ 16.3 & 16.5. See also ERIK LUNA & WAYNE MCCORMACK, UNDERSTANDING THE
LAW OF TERRORISM § 7.01[A], at 378 (2d. ed. 2015) (stating that “just war theory distinguishes
between rules that govern the justice in going to war (jus ad bellum) and rules that govern justice
in conducting war (jus in bello).”).
161. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 16.5.2 (enumerating examples of activity that would
not constitute an “attack”).
162. Biller & Schmitt, supra note 156, at 213 (citing provisions of Tallin Manual regarding
means of warfare); Goldsmith, supra note 156, at 133-135 (discussing examples of cyber-attacks
that could be deemed uses of force).
163. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 16.3.3.4.
164. Eric Talbot Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L.
735, 750-53 (2017) (discussing problem of attribution and highlighting provisions of Tallin Manual
that address the issue).
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force to down an unmanned American military surveillance drone.165
President Trump considered a forcible response that would likely have
produced casualties, but eventually did not order that response because it
would have been disproportionate to Iran’s action.166 Instead, the President
later reported that the United States Navy downed an Iranian drone in July
2019, in what the Navy described as a “defensive” measure using “electronic
warfare methods.”167 Was the Iranian military’s action a hostile one? Likely,
yes. But absent an immediate forcible response from the American
government, could the United States be described as engaging in “actual
hostilities” with Iran? Does the downing of an Iranian drone a month later
now constitute “actual hostilities?” To put it in the context of treason law,
would an American citizen be guilty of treason if he or she provided material
support to the Iranian regime after the downing of the drone? Possibly, if
the United States determined that there was “actual hostility” with Iran.
These are the kinds of complexities that the current international system
presents for treason law. To be sure, there are simpler cases. But treason
talk must also account for the more complicated ones. These are useful,
likely critical, conversations to have about American treason. But they
demand prudent—not loose, casual, or reckless—rhetoric, which
thoughtfully considers the Constitution’s understanding of American
enemies.

IV. Accounting for the Treason Mens Rea
It is worth briefly discussing one other firmly embedded aspect of
treason law, though one not clearly articulated in the constitutional text, that
has become lost in today’s treason talk. In addition to an overt act of aid and
comfort to an “enemy,” treason requires proof of a distinctive mens rea
element: intent to betray. So, even if Russia or Iran or the Islamic State could
be regarded as an “enemy,” and even if someone with American allegiance
engaged in overt action that would have aided one of those entities, such acts
would not be treasonous unless accompanied by the mens rea to betray the
United States.
The requisite mens rea for treason is not immediately evident from the
text of the Treason Clause. That is because it does not employ conventional
165. Joshua Berlinger et al., Iran Shoots Down US Drone Aircraft, Raising Tensions Further
in Strait of Hormuz, CNN.com (June 20, 2019, 8:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/20/midd
leeast/iran-drone-claim-hnk-intl/index.html.
166. Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Says He was ‘Cocked and Loaded’ to Strike Iran, but
Pulled Back, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/politics/trumpiran-attack.html.
167. Nahal Toosi & Caitlin Oprysko, Drone Downing Imperils Trump’s Iran Outreach,
POLITICO (July 18, 2019, 7:18 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/18/trump-warshipiranian-drone-1422145.
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mens rea terminology from modern criminal law (terms like “intentionally”
or “knowingly”). But the requirement of an intent to betray the country was
familiar to English treason commentators, and to American authorities.
Blackstone said that “a bare intent to commit treason is many times actual
treason: as imagining the death of the king, or conspiring to take away his
crown.”168
Early treason cases referred to treasonous intention.169
Additionally, Justice Joseph Story spoke of “intention” and “treasonable
purpose” while adjudicating a treason case in Rhode Island.170 As Hurst has
described this state of mind generally, it is an intent to “benefit the enemy’s
war effort and to harm that of the United States.”171
The Supreme Court later articulated its understanding of treason mens
rea in Cramer,172 the 1945 decision arising out of the arrival and eventual
arrest of the Nazi saboteurs. The Court grounded treason mens rea in the
text’s use of the term “adhering.”173 Justice Jackson’s Opinion stated,
[a] citizen may favor the enemy and harbor sympathies or
convictions disloyal to this country’s policy or interest, but so long
as he commits no act of aid or comfort to the enemy, there is no
treason. On the other hand, a citizen may take actions, which do aid
and comfort the enemy—making a speech critical of the government
or opposing its measures, profiteering, striking in defense plants or
essential work, and the hundred other things which impair our
cohesion and diminish our strength . . . but if there is no adherence to
the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason.”174
Justice Jackson also sought to reconcile any tension between the mens
rea and the overt act requirement: “Questions of intent in a treason case are
even more complicated than in most criminal cases because of the peculiarity
of the two different elements which together make the offense.”175
Treasonous intent cannot be shown through overt acts that are negligent or
undesigned.176 “To make treason,” according to Justice Jackson, “the
168. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *35.
169. U.S. v. Hoxie, 26 F. Cas. 397, 399 (C.C.D. Vt. 1808) (No 15,407); U.S. v. Pryor, 27 F.
Cas. 628, 630 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 16,096).
170. Charge to the Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1046, 1047 (C.C.D. R.I. 1842).
171. Hurst, supra note 66, at 244. See also Vasanthakumar, supra note 59, at 208 (elaborating
upon the intent to betray, and noting that it includes the defendant’s awareness that she owes
allegiance).
172. Cramer v. U.S., 325 U.S. 1 (1945). For excellent commentary on the Cramer litigation,
see Crane, supra note 52.
173. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 29.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 31.
176. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 31.
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defendant must not only intend the act, but he must intend to betray his
country by means of the act.”177 Treasonous intent can be inferred from
conduct (including the relevant overt act itself), and one is deemed to intend
the natural consequences of his actions.178 The Court exculpated Cramer.179
Cramer, thus, leaves some ambiguity in the law of treason mens rea,
jumping between what appears to be a requirement of specific intent and one
of also inferring intent from the natural consequences of one’s actions. As I
have argued previously,180 a requirement of specific intent would be
consistent not only with the meaning of “adhere” in the constitutional text,
and with the desire to maintain a narrow definition of treason,181 but also
with the law of accomplice liability, which is the best criminal law analogue
to the Constitution’s “aid and comfort” provision.182 Though he does not
analogize the law of accomplice liability as I do, Hurst argues that the
“natural consequences formula” can be reconciled with the requirement of
specific intent when placed in the context of what the individual defendant
knew.183 Importantly, then, the Court followed Cramer in two later cases
that did not question Cramer’s language on mens rea.
In Haupt v. United States,184 the Court sustained the treason conviction
of an American father of one of the Nazi saboteurs. The father assisted his
son by finding him shelter, a job, and a car, all with knowledge of the son’s
sabotage mission.185 Because the father acted with the purpose of assisting
his son in executing the German sabotage effort, the Government was able
to prove the treasonous intent to betray.186 Indeed, the Court set forth
evidence showing that father Haupt planned to return to Germany after the
war (which he believed America would lose), that he would not allow his
son to fight for the American Army and “that he would kill his son before he
would send him to fight Germany.”187
And in Kawakita v. United States,188 a dual Japanese-American citizen
had traveled to Japan to pursue an education, but also took a job at a nickel
company that supplied the Japanese war effort, and used American prisoners
177. Id.
178. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 31-32.
179. Id. at 39-40.
180. Broughton, Snowden Affair, supra note 42, at 25-27.
181. Hurst, supra note 66, at 193.
182. Broughton, Snowden Affair, supra note 42, at 28.
183. Hurst, supra note 66, at 202-03; see also Vasanthakumar, supra note 59, at 208 (describing
the Court’s approach to treason intent as the “more demanding” specific intent approach). For a
different, pre-Cramer view, see Charles Warren, What Is Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy?,
27 YALE L.J. 331, 333-34 (1918).
184. Haupt v. U.S, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
185. Id. at 632-33.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 642.
188. Tomoya Kawakita v. U.S., 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
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of war as employees.
In communicating with the American prisoners of
war, Kawakita made it clear that he supported the Japanese effort against
America, saying, for example: “You Americans don’t have no chance. We
will win the war; We will kill all you prisoners right here anyway, whether
you win the war or lose it. You will never get back to the States; I will be
glad when all of the Americans is dead, and then I can go home and live
happy.”190 Writing for the Majority, Justice William O. Douglas stated that
“[o]ne may think disloyal thoughts and have his heart on the side of the
enemy. Yet if he commits no act giving aid and comfort to the enemy, he is
not guilty of treason.”191 Justice Douglas wrote further, “He may on the other
hand commit acts which do give aid and comfort to the enemy, and yet not
be guilty of treason, as for example when he acts impulsively with no intent
to betray.”192 There, Kawakita’s treasonous intent could be inferred from his
many professions of loyalty to the enemy.193
In each case, as Hurst notes in his summary of the post-Cramer law on
treason mens rea, it is significant that defendants in cases like Haupt and
Kawakita “were shown to have declared their animus against the United
States war effort and their desire that the enemy prevail.”194 Against this
legal backdrop, it is easier to understand why we should be skeptical of many
of today’s treason accusations. Take the example of Trump’s Helsinki
meeting, which some, including respected current and former governmental
officials, called “treasonous.”195 Assume, for the sake of this example, that
Russia is an American enemy. Assume further that the President engaged in
an overt act that would aid and comfort the Russians—for example, by
failing to condemn Russian election interference, or by casting doubt on
American intelligence conclusions about Russian active measures, the
President thereby encouraged or bolstered Russia’s fortitude in carrying out
cyber-incursions or in further meddling in future American elections. The
President’s state of mind in doing the act still matters.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 743. Kawakita said further: “Well, you guys needn’t be interested in when the war
will be over because you won’t go back; you will stay here and work. I will go back to the States
because I am an American citizen.” Id.
191. Id. at 736.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 742-43.
194. Hurst, supra note 66, at 246. Hurst also notes in this summary the radio-broadcast cases
from the World War II era, in which Americans were convicted of treason for conducting radio
broadcasts designed to spread propaganda and assist the German war effort. See, e.g., Chandler v.
U.S., 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948); Best v, U.S., 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950). As Hurst notes,
although Chandler and Best argued that their broadcasts would benefit the United States, this did
not negate their intent to assist Germany in winning and the United States in losing. Hurst, supra
note 66, at 246. This was sufficient for proof of the treasonous intent, even if combined with a nontreasonous motive. Id.
195. Zhao, supra note 23; Lillis, supra note 23.
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If it could be proven that the President sought to protect the Russian
regime from greater scrutiny, or bolster its fortitude, so that it could continue
to pursue harmful hostile action against the United States, the treason charge
could gain greater traction, though it would still encounter the “enemy”
problem. On the other hand, the President’s actions in Helsinki could
arguably reflect the sincere, though perhaps foolish, belief that his conduct
would help improve United States-Russia relations; or help secure Russian
cooperation in American counterterrorism efforts; or ensure Russia’s help
with other diplomatic or security matters. If that is the case, then the
President has not done the act with the intent to betray America. That is true
even if his act actually aids the Russians in their endeavor to harm American
interests, or otherwise gain some strategic geopolitical advantage. The
President may have been guilty of poor judgment or foolhardiness, but being
naïve is not synonymous with being a traitor.
The instances in which President Trump has lobbed treason accusations
are even weaker with respect to treason mens rea. The public commentary
has not focused on it, but in none of these instances—for example, judicially
authorized surveillance of Trump campaign officials, law enforcement
agents privately expressing hope for the election of another candidate, a
newspaper publishing reports about an American attack on a Russian
grid196—is there evidence of an intent to betray the United States, that is,
“adherence” to an American enemy. In none of these instances does there
appear to be any evidence that these individuals desired enemy success at the
expense of the United States, or that they intended harm to befall the United
States so as to favor an enemy. So, quite apart from the enemy problem
identified earlier, the President’s public accusations of treason do not even
attempt to grapple with the problem of proving treasonous intent.
Of course, the Court has acknowledged that sometimes the overt act
will manifest the intent to betray, and this is sufficient for proof of the treason
mens rea.197 It is also true that the intent to do the underlying act and the
intent to betray will often converge by inference, as the dual intents converge
in the conventional criminal law of accomplice liability.198 But as in the
Helsinki example, there may be cases where the act of aid and comfort, even
if done intentionally, is not done with and does not manifest any intent to
betray, but rather has some other—perhaps misguided, otherwise unlawful,
or entirely innocent—objective. This is not to say that a mixed objective
cannot be treasonous. In Haupt, for example, Hans claimed a fatherly desire

196.
197.
198.
2015).

See infra Parts I and II.C.
See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 31-32 & n.42.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 30.05[A], at 474 & n.77 (7th ed.
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to care for the well-being of his son Herbert.
But this was not mutually
exclusive from an intent to betray the United States, by helping to facilitate
Herbert’s sabotage mission on behalf of the German Reich (combined with
sentiments suggesting Hans was loyal to the Germans).200 So, even in cases
of multiple potential purposes, or a purpose mixed with motive, treason
remains a potential charge so long as one of the purposes is an intent to
betray.201
Still, though, the high bar of treason mens rea supplies yet another
reason for more prudent treason talk; it is not an insurmountable hurdle, as
Haupt and Kawakita demonstrate. Once we find facts that can be placed in
the context of intentional aid to a foreign terrorist organization, or other
group or nation actively engaged in open hostilities with the United States,
we see a more plausible convergence of the elements—including the intent
to betray.

V. Conclusion
Promiscuous talk of treason has become rampant, particularly on the
presidential Twitter account. On the upside, although non-prosecution of
treason for over a half-century might lead one to wonder whether treason
was effectively dead, this treason-talk has at least kept treason alive.
Keeping treason alive is especially important if we value the criminalization
of national disloyalty, and are willing to recognize the legitimate cases of
treason in our midst.
But merely keeping treason alive with careless rhetoric will never be
enough justify its enforcement. Using treason rhetoric merely as a colloquial
epithet or as a political weapon will only serve to relegate treason to lowerorder politics, or create an atmosphere in which it is understood merely as a
tool for strongmen or electoral opportunists. These effects will delegitimize
treason as a crime worthy of serious prosecutorial consideration, which will
further undermine, rather than strengthen, the enforcement of a criminal law
of national disloyalty. Greater care is of special necessity in light of the
underdeveloped and often complex nature of American treason law, where
questions about who is an American enemy, and whether someone intended
to betray the country with his actions, remain essential questions with often
elusive answers.
There are important conversations still to be had about American
treason in both the political and legal arenas. If we desire an American
treason law that is sufficiently robust to use responsibly in an appropriate
case—and there are good reasons to think that we should—then public talk
199.
200.
201.

Haupt, 330 U.S. at 641-42.
Id. at 642.
Hurst, supra note 66, at 245-46.
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about treason, particularly amongst political and governmental leaders, must
align better with the constitutional text and with the law’s mandates about
the limits of treason as a criminal sanction. Public discourse about national
loyalty, and of treason as a particular form of national betrayal, can be
valuable—even crucial—to promoting national unity and security. That
discourse should reach for the Constitution, not ignore it.

